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The cult of the boss
L U C I A  M I C H E L U T T I
‘Today muscle is power. Earlier, only the son
of the king could rule. Today everybody can
rule. You need weapons to rule. Leaders need
to have guns. Not everybody should  have guns
– only people with status. However, nowadays
everyone who wishes can get guns and rule.’
– Raghu Yadav,
Dabang (boss) in western UP
THE North Indian boss contrasts
kingly power with ‘muscle and gun
power’, in a world where sufficient
force and electoral politics can lever-
age rule.1 Today, bossism is played out
against a backdrop of rapid economic
growth, and a scramble for economic
resources. Alongside the manipula-
tion of later forms of capitalism, com-
petitive electoral politics (and their
rising costs) are the pillars of the con-
struction of decentralized fiefdoms
headed by Mafia-esque bosses.2
Across South Asia, the bosses’
styles of governance created systems
of economic and political governance
which are popularly referred to with ver-
nacular terms such as ‘Mafia Raj’,
‘Goonda Raj’ and ‘Mastangiri’ – rule by
mafia, or rule by gangsters. These sys-
tems, which use force to accelerate the
path towards power and wealth, share
similarities with the Caciques and
Caudillos of Latin America, the Mafiosi
in Italy, urban political machines in the
United States, and today’s gangster
politicians in Indonesia, Russia, Thai-
land, Philippines, Bulgaria, Turkey,
Jamaica, Colombia and Brazil.
And yet, despite similarities in the
ways which South Asian bosses func-
tion, acquire authority, wield power,
and gain influence in their respective
domains, they are distinctively shaped
by the subcontinent’s unique passion
for ‘the political’, and some of the high-
est rates of participation and contes-
tation in the world. Consequently,
‘Mafia Raj is not an authoritarian but
a hybrid system of political and eco-
nomic governance which combine
elements of redistributive, market,
predatory and democratic logics.3
Drawing on ethnographic mate-
rial collected in provincial town in west-
ern Uttar Pradesh, I shall explore in this
1. Research for this paper has been conducted
within the framework of the research pro-
gramme ‘Democratic Cultures’ (http://www.
ucl.ac.uk/democratic-cultures) which I con-
vened between 2012 and 2016 (funded by fol-
lowing grants: ERC-AIMSA/284080 and
ESRC-ES/I036702/1). Throughout the text
I omitted names and/or used pseudonymous
and obscured localities.
2. This essay greatly relies on experts from a
book manuscript co-authored with Ashraf
Hoque, Nicolas Martin, David Picherit,
Paul Rollier, Arild Ruud and Clarinda Still
entitled ‘Mafia Raj: The Rule of Bosses in
South Asia’.
3. For the elaboration of the concept of
‘hybrid state’, see Jaffe (2013: 735). On the
concept of ‘Mafia Raj’, see Michelutti (forth-
coming).
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essay what the presence of bosses on
the Indian political scene tells us about
‘democratic authoritarianism’ in South
Asia and beyond. I suggest that look-
ing at the morphology of small-scale
bosses’ authority in provincial North
India has the potential to shed some
light on the symbiotic relations bet-
ween democratic processes and vio-
lent entrepreneurial styles of political
leadership. I also suggest that attention
to the local dynamics of systems of
(criminal) power and their multiple
sources of authority may help to under-
stand the rising global appreciation
for leaders who cultivate a boss-like
attitude like Putin, Erdogan, Modi
and Trump or the late Chavez. How do
muscular entrepreneurship, business
acumen, managerial culture and cin-
ematographic charisma provide a tem-
plate for contemporary democratic
politics? Are bosses ultimately chosen
because they are authoritative or
authoritarian?
I shall now go back to the opening
quote by Raghu Yadav. The context of
my research (western Uttar Pradesh)
is widely known for its endemic vio-
lence and criminality,4 for being cultur-
ally shaped by the ‘macho’ ethos of its
dominant castes, for being marred by
communalism and caste based con-
flicts, and by poverty and underdeve-
lopment.5 However, what is perhaps
deeply misleading is the portrayal of
this region as a poor backwater. On
the contrary, ‘money’ – as informants
again and again emphasize – ‘is not an
issue here’. A rampant predatory eco-
nomy linked to the construction and
estate development sectors has created
new opportunities and significant
wealth over the past decade.
Raghu is one of the bosses I
shadowed in their daily life during field-
work.6 He is a small-scale town’s boss.
In the literature, the paradigmatic boss
is an individual who acquires power
by achieving monopolistic or quasi-
monopolistic control over an area’s
coercive and economic resources.7
The boss is a person who claims for
himself (for it is normally a ‘he’) the
rights to discipline and punish, protect,
tax, and represent local populations.
In short, bosses not only want to make
money through criminal enterprises or
to mediate other’s people access to
state institutions, they want to rule.
The aspiration to rule requires
investing in a special set of resources
that are not necessarily available to
illegal entrepreneurs, brokers or indi-
vidual criminals. A crucial resource is
the threat of violence. However,
bosses do not rely exclusively on brute
force when ruling. Violence is neces-
sarily coupled with legal and illegal
entrepreneurship, charisma and per-
suasion, rules and honour, kinship net-
works, intelligence, professional legal
and financial advice and, crucially,
collusion with political and administra-
tive resources.8
In western Uttar Pradesh the most
powerful violent bosses are often
referred to as dabangs. The term
dabang entered the popular lexicon
following the release of two films by
that name in 2010 and 2012 and is now
commonly used to refer to mafia boss-
type leaders. Dabangs, unlike mere
goondas, are public authorities and can
instil both fear and respect. As an
informant explained: ‘A goonda is just
a hired thug; to be a dabang you need
to be charismatic, people need to give
you influence, you need to stand out.’
What defines a dabang is com-
mand. Crucially dabangs, or their close
relatives, occupy political seats that
afford them both prestige and a degree
of state protection. Moreover a typi-
cal dabang uses his/her own ‘crew’ as
bodyguards, travels in white 4/4s with
red beacons and party flags, and
flaunts his/her wealth and power with
weapons, ostentatious gold jewellery,
and large farmhouses on the outskirts
of town. Most importantly, the contem-
porary dabang is also a successful and
legitimate businessman.
It is important to highlight that the
dabangs I met over the course of my
fieldwork represent a qualitative shift
from the traditional figures of the bhaia
or dada in any North Indian provincial
town until about two decades ago. The
traditional town and neighbourhood
bosses used to establish their sover-
eignty through protection rackets,
money lending, and adjudicating
disputes.9 These old style protectors-
cum-social bandits boasted of an excep-
tional muscular physique and reputed
fighting techniques – usually acquired
through wrestling. They employed
their force to establish domination
in the mohalla (neighbourhood) and
6. In the field I documented bosses’ will to
rule. I mapped their territories, areas of domi-
nation, spheres of interest and jurisdictions.
I followed them during election campaigns
or appearances in court. I observed their styles
of self-presentation, rhetoric, and the sites that
they choose to gather support or to perform.
These spaces included caste or business
association meetings, religious festivals,
bazaars, wrestling arenas, university campus,
hotels, lodges and night clubs, commemora-
tion ceremonies and sports events. I inter-
viewed members of the bosses’ families, gang
members, enemies, rivals, businessmen, crimi-
nal lawyers, crime reporters, accountants,
doctors, police investigators, astrologists,
priests, and the residents of the ‘spaces’
where bosses operate.
7. On bosses as violent enterpreneurs and on
party machine/bossism, see Scott (1969);
Migdal (1988); on Italy, Blok (1972); Chubb
(1982); on East Asia, Sidel (1999); on Indo-
nesia, Wilson (2015); on India, Weiner (1963)
and Vaishnav (2011); on Pakistan, Gayer
(2014); on Russia, Volkov (2002).
8. Michelutti et al (Ibid: Introduction).
9. For descriptions of the figure of the bhaia
in provincial North India see, Gooptu (2001);
Michelutti (2010); in Mumbai see, Hansen
(2001).
4. Brass (1997).
5. Jeffrey, Jeffery and Lerche (2014).
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to acquire ‘violent’ credibility with
their patrons (who were often the local
politicians).
By contrast, today the small-
town bosses and their associates have
transmogrified into well financed inter-
state criminal networks whose crimi-
nal capital is used to build up political
turfs and business fortunes. These
bosses do not help politicians to gov-
ern any more: they themselves govern,
directly or indirectly.
A  former ward representative,
Raghu Yadav is in his later fifties. His
son and daughter-in-law are currently
ward representatives in two different
parts of the town. His father-in-law is
an MLA and various relatives on both
sides of his family are zila parishad
members. Raghu regularly acts as the
local mohalla’s adjudicator. People
flock to him (and pay him) to resolve
disputes and to maintain order in the
neighbourhood. In particular, people
come to him when they find them-
selves entangled with the slow and cor-
rupted Indian justice system and police.
Raghu Yadav has personal sove-
reignty. He dispenses justice and col-
lects money (‘goonda tax’) against
protection. His brother is a key figure
in the local ‘bhumi mafia’ (land mafia).
His uncle is involved in the local ‘oil
racket’. These ‘mafias’ are at the apex
of much more extensive local criminal
economic systems which to function
need to be symbiotically related to for-
mal, registered and regulated institu-
tions and ‘the political’ sphere. Raghu
has invested profit from illegal activi-
ties into legitimate business. He now
manages two hotels, three restaurants
and a cement factory. He owns several
apartments in the newly constructing
colonies which are springing out in the
outskirts of town. Raghu describes him-
self as a successful businessman and a
politician and he proudly adds, ‘I am
also what people call a dabang: a boss.’
A s the other dabangs I have met he
has an air of self-assurance and com-
mand, which I think is usually one of
the bosses’ best assets. Raghu does not
need to use violence very much nowa-
days. The threat of violence is enough.
‘Nowadays I use violence very mini-
mally. To tell you the truth, I used wea-
pons in public only twice in my life. Yes,
believe me, I have only used twice in
my whole 30 years’ career of leader-
ship. You know Ram, my youngest
son. Well, I have an older son too.
Once he was beaten up by his class
teacher. My son lost consciousness
from the concussion. I was furious.
I went to the school and slapped the
teacher.
‘After that, I was surrounded by
five teachers. It was then that I took
out my Mauser. The teachers, when
they saw the weapon, ran away
quickly. I fired one bullet but it did not
harm anyone. There was no FIR case
registered against me. I used a weapon
for self-defence. I knew that even if
there was a chargesheet against me
I could get bail… It was a case of self-
defence. Even if I would have got
caught, the sentence would have been
minor… Weapons are very important
for the protection of the life. Weapons
are crucial to protect yourself.
‘The second time I used a gun in
public was when I fired during the
Ramnavami festival…. I went to the
temple with my sons. It was very
crowded. My youngest son (Shiv –
who is the one who is ward representa-
tive for X now) was already notorious
when he was a kid. He is really my
darling boy. Fearless and only 23
years old. He has been charged for
attempted murder twice already. He
is the youngest city ward member….
to go back to the temple story. We
were standing in the queue. Shiv
jumped the queue. There was a group
of boys and one of them slapped Shiv
and singled him out from the queue.
‘Shiv came back to me in tears.
I asked him what happened. I went to
talk to those boys. One of the boys
twisted my wrist. Can you imagine?
The fight started and at a certain point
I took the gun out and fired (laughs)…
that led to a total stampede …those
boys (now men) still run away when
they see me (more laughs)…’
Unpredictability and arbitrariness
are still at the heart of the bosses’
local authority and are cultivated in
the popular narratives. After all, as
Volkov points out, ‘it [the capacity to
use violence] becomes similar to
a commercial reputation’10 – people
come to you of their own accord to
enforce services or settle disputes
or to offer a ticket to contest elections.
As Raghu explicitly pointed out, ‘After
all, it is not what you do and how capa-
ble of doing violence you are. What
counts is what people believe you are
capable of doing. It is the people who
make you a dabang (a boss)! Not the
other way around…’ and, ‘If people
see you as powerful, then you are.’
Such comments highlight how
the bosses’ authority is co-produced
and co-experienced. Bossism is a
relational affair. A tendency to focus
on individual leaders rather than on the
social production and day-to-day man-
agement of their authority may lead
to interpretations which emphasize
the autocratic, authoritarian, and popu-
list potential of bossism. What often
remains under-analysed is the rela-
tional and horizontal nature of such
forms of authority, the complicities and
opportunistic partnerships which bind
and connect bosses with the popula-
tion among whom they live and ‘boss’.
In North India, the ideal of
a strong, ‘wild’ and dangerous boss
has shaped political cultures. An old
repertoire of tropes of honour, kingly
10. Volkov (2002: 45).
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leadership, and heroism that valorize
‘criminal heroes’ feeds into the value
placed on toughness and physical
strength. For example, certain politi-
cally successful caste groups (such as
the Yadavs in northern India) capital-
ize on ideas of community honour and
‘divine kinship’ to legitimize bossism.11
Elsewhere, I showed how the bosses
build their image of strength and action
on a wide repertoire of cultural and
religious resources that help to create
a legitimate ‘muscular charisma’. This
type of charisma is often seen as a
quality inherited from hero-gods and
sanctified by anti-colonialist figures,
and enhanced by achievements in
leading contemporary democratic
social revolutions.12 This is also
reflected in the widespread idioms
of fearlessness and virility that sur-
round political and economic life and
the popular imagery that advertises
politicians’ ‘heroic’ (bahadur) capac-
ity to protect.
A ‘tough reputation’ and the
proven capacity to exercise violence
is said to bring together the two long
valued capabilities of the traditional
ruler: to protect and provide. Bosses
often choose to project an image of
men of action: men who can ‘get things
done for their people’.13 The qualities
of effectiveness, potency and courage
also signify the wealth, status and poli-
tical empowerment of the community
which they represent and rule. In simi-
lar ways, local people feel special and
empowered through being linked by
kinship (fictive and real) to their bosses.
What happens when leaders fail to
project ‘boss-like’ authority? In mid-
2012, a couple of months after
Akhilesh Yadav had become UP chief
minister, locals started to be concerned
about his lack of authority and inca-
pacity to instil order through fear and
respect. People would say that UP was
run by four and a half chief ministers:
Mulayam Singh Yadav (Akhilesh’s
father), Ram Gopal Yadav and Shivpal
Singh Yadav (Akhilesh’s uncles),
Azam Khan, and Akhilesh is the half.
‘There are too many bosses,’
I was told at the time. ‘Every Yadav
in town thinks he is the boss.’ Com-
parisons were constantly made with
the previous BSP government and the
capacity of Mayawati (the Dalit BSP
leader) to keep the bureaucracy under
control. By contrast the SP govern-
ment was portrayed as chaotic due to
the availability of multiple and often
competing centres of power within the
Samajwadi Party.
As one informant pointed out when
commenting on the difference bet-
ween the previous BSP regime under
Chief Minister Mayawati and the cur-
rent SP regime: ‘You see …Mayawati
was alone – she has no family, no sons
or daughters, no uncles! And she just
took the money for herself and to build
statues, but there are at least 20 rela-
tives in Mulayam’s family who occupy
elected state and national assembly
seats – and hundreds of them at the
local level, all of whom feel entitled to
loot the state for as long as the SP stays
in power’ (Rattan Singh, 35 years old,
milk seller).
Around that time a story begun
to circulate in the region: Akhilesh
was having an animated discussion with
his party men in his office in Etawah
where they were having a meeting
about party issues. Akhilesh became
very animated and one of the party
workers put a hand on his shoulder and
gently said, ‘Bhaiyya, calm down.’
Akhilesh kept on talking as if nothing
had happened. The day after, the man
was found decapitated; his head was
delivered to the chief minister. People
would tell this story with a mixture of
horror and pleasure. Some felt almost
reassured by it. In a way it showed
them that their CM was not as weak as
the press and media kept portraying
him. In short, he was not just a puppet
in the hands of his father and uncles.
Five years later Akhilesh Yadav is
fighting to establish his authority
within his family/party. The press,
social media and TV describe the
Yadav family feud using Mahabharata
images. The father, Mulayam Singh
Yadav fought to keep his role as the
party’s leader. In the end Akhilesh
‘won the war’ and is now the boss.
It is not coincidental that during
the ongoing Uttar Pradesh election
campaign (2017) two of the most
circulated and shared videos in the
social media feature the CM as actor
Shah Rukh Khan as a big boss in the
Bollywood hits Raees and Don 2. The
latter clip, entitled ‘Akhilesh 2’, fea-
tures Akhilesh Yadav acting Shah
Rukh Khan’s famous lines in Don 2:
‘My enemies were thinking that I would
never return. But I will come back’
(‘Mere dushman samajh rahe the
main ab kabhi laut kar na aunga...
mujhe pehchano, dekho main hoon
kaun. Aa raha hoon palat ke.’)
Systems of bossism are certainly
testosterone-charged style of govern-
ance. These videos reflect and feed
into the popular figure of the boss which
stands for action, power, money and
glamour. In today’s world, thanks
to Hollywood and South Asian film
industries and streaming, ‘the boss’ has
become a powerful cross-cultural
theoretical archetype. The provision of
justice, the redistribution of material
goods and intimidation are central
building blocks of the bosses’ local
authority as I briefly outlined above
using Raghu’s life history.
However, what is also very
important (and less explored) is the
11. Michelutti (2010).
12. Michelutti (2013).
13. See Michelutti (2010; 2014); Witsoe
(2009); and Berenschot (2011).
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role of the fantastic power of the self-
made entrepreneurial boss in shaping
political leaders’ authority. Another
video clip again features Akhilesh as
Shah Rukh Khan, this time in the movie
Raees saying: ‘My mum used to say
no business is small and no religion is
bigger than business. What is good for
business is good. What is bad for busi-
ness is bad.’ Later, Shah Rukh Khan
says that he combines in himself both
business sense (the brain of a Bania)
and daring. The video concludes with
a veiled threat, ‘Aa raha hoon’ (I am
coming!).14
It should be emphasized that this is
a world where the economy governs
politics, not the other way around.
Nowadays, leaders need to project a
capacity to make money, to run suc-
cessful businesses and make profit-
able deals. Raghu not only protects
neighbourhoods, but also runs a large
assemblage of legitimate business
companies and properties. People
often admire him for having built a
small fortune from nothing and for
building up a local political dynasty.
This is indeed a world where
bosses are increasingly respected
because they are successful, self-
made men (and occasionally women)
who ambitiously dare to take risks,
manage to accumulate wealth, and
build a better life for themselves, their
families, their clients, and associates.
Bosses are characters who are capa-
ble of shouting loudly: ‘You’re not my
boss!’ As such they are often admired
for their determination and their
claim to re-establish order. They are
also admired because they appear to
challenge caste and class barriers,
gender roles, family hierarchies and
inequalities. Defying and escaping
death, and their being ‘above the law’
also gives them an aura of extraordi-
nariness. These mythologies of power
create hopes and dreams of individual
self-determination, and exploit shared
imaginaries of popular emancipation
and desire for freedom. Thus, the
bosses’ public ‘declarations of inde-
pendence’ through charismatic impro-
vization and pragmatic complicities
give voice to widespread cultural val-
ues of defiance, pride, respectability,
and self-worth. In turn, these emergent
mythologies of power vernacularize
ideas and practice of democracy and
the economy in new ways.15
It follows that people appreciate
bosses because they are authoritative,
not because they are authoritarian.
The appeal of bosses should not be con-
fused with a demand for authoritarian
strongmen. People do not want a new
‘Indira Gandhi’. What they appreciate
is a boss, not an autocrat. They want
individuals who are capable of leading,
commanding and getting things done.
Bosses do not run or aspire to run
‘authoritarian regimes’ – they run
agile il/legal enterprises and work in
unison with other criminals, business-
men and politician to create an envi-
ronment (‘Mafia Raj’) which fits their
needs.
Free market logics are at the
heart of this systems of governance.
Bosses work with ‘democracy’ and
not against it as it would not be profit-
able to do the opposite. It follows that
the presence of bosses does not auto-
matically create authoritarian regimes
or failed states as has often been
assumed. Bosses do not have an inter-
est in subverting local political and
economic structures. As Brisquet and
Faravel-Garrigues argued, bosses are
‘very often satisfied with the existing
rules of the political and economic
game in which they move. Their fami-
liarity with “the system” allows them
to detect opportunities that enable them
to develop their activities.’16
It should be also noted that bosses
do not have unlimited powers and
monopolies. The relation between
bosses and the populations they com-
mand is extremely volatile. Impor-
tantly, populations live in contexts in
which there are overlapping reper-
toires of authority. Raghu is certainly
not the only authority available in
town. People pay their dues to several
of them at the same time.17 The vola-
tile, unstable, evanescent and ‘demo-
cratic’ relations between the boss and
their citizen-subjects distinguish this
relationship from patron-client or
king-servant hierarchical relations.
It follows that the systems of
‘Mafia Raj’ cannot be painted as a
monochrome picture of victims, vil-
lains, autocrats, criminals or heroes.
These are worlds in which it is often
difficult to establish who the victim
and who the perpetrator is, as individu-
als may be both at different times and
in different spaces. Raghu is a boss but
is also ‘bossed’ by bigger big men in
the constituency and the region.
The bosses’ positions are also
perpetually insecure; they live in con-
stant fear, fear of losing their position,
their money, and their power. They
have to continuously look over their
shoulders to guard against ambitious
young men and their own henchmen.
Significantly, elections constantly put
their power and impunity into question.
Electoral democracy keeps them on
their toes. Even seemingly untouch-
able bosses may fall (though some-
14. See the videos at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=s1tua-hd2_g (accessed 20/02/
2017) and https://www. youtube.com/
watch?v=JjXmuPb9Hzk (accessed 20/02/
2017). 15. Michelutti et al. (Ibid.: Introduction).
16. Briquet and Faravel-Garrigues (2010: 4).
17. Hansen (2005).
18. Jaffe (2013: 736) makes a similar point
discussing donmanship in inner-city Jamaica.
19. Armao (2015).
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times only temporarily) when they
lose an election. The bosses’ power is
hence precarious and needs to be con-
stantly reinstated and performed.
Ultimately these systems are ‘neither
hegemonic nor subaltern but a hybrid
mix of both’.18 They successfully com-
bine the local dimension of territorial
control through plundering and the
global dimension of the transnational
markets.19 The result is a localized
parcellation of authority which may not
be necessarily complementary with
top-down authoritarian regimes as
hyper-fragmentation makes difficult
the implementation of policies and
ideologies on the ground. In the region,
such fragmentation also makes elec-
toral results hard to predict as elections
are increasingly decided booth by booth.
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